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ABSTRACT 
Civil aviation contributes over $900 billion to the U.S. economy annually and the cost of 
securing U.S. aviation against criminal and terrorist attack runs in the billions of dollars. 
Therefore, it is critical to use appropriate metrics in managing the security policy and 
programs. Nonetheless, aviation security has typically evolved haphazardly as a reaction 
to changing criminal events, often resulting in widespread controversy. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office and the media have questioned many Transportation 
Security Administration procedures. This thesis uses formative program evaluation and 
policy analysis to investigate current assessment of airport security programs. It identifies 
innovative public administration and policy-analysis tools that could provide potential 
benefit to airport security. These tools will complement the System Based Risk 
Management framework if the Transportation Security Administration involves more 
stakeholders in collecting and analyzing pertinent data, proactive planning, and 
developing solutions.  
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Either actual war, or constant studious preparation for war, actually never 
ceases. And it is difficult to say which is the worse of the two…The never-
ceasing preparation for war seems actually to cost more. (Gordon, 1914) 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the late 1960s, the United States (U.S.) government has reacted to aviation 
crime by hastily implementing new regulations, often without the benefit of structured 
analysis. On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda increased the stakes in the effort to guarantee 
airline passenger safety. As a result, the United States ramped up its counter tactics. 
Numerous studies describe how when the programs mandated by these new regulations 
are evaluated, the lack of specific objectives, goals, and accepted standard measurements, 
prevent reliable conclusions. With today’s public sector deficits and thin airline profit 
margins, airport operators and regulators need a dependable system to gauge the 
effectiveness and efficiency of airport security.  
Aviation security has evolved reactively, transforming as criminal tactics 
changed. Prior to 1948, incidents of aeronautic malevolence were a nonissue and 
averaged less than one per annum (See Figures 1 and 2). From 1948 to 1968, skyjacking 
became a common mode to attempt to escape communism. However, these attempts 
normally ended with the perpetrator being shot or arrested and since the United States 

















1940s 0 0 7 25
1950s 2 45 13 21
1960s 6 136 9 244
1970s 2 0 21 559
1980s 3 314 12 869
1990s 0 0 4 37
2001+ 1 0* 2 90
* Does not include the 2532 deaths during 9/11.  

















Figure 2.   Chart of Aviation Crime and Fatalities  
In 1944, the International Civil Aviation Organization was formed and met in 
Chicago to “secure international cooperation” in establishing standards and procedures to 
advance civil aviation and has been a major factor in aviation security. Today, the 
organization is an agency within the United Nations with 188 nation members. The 
majority of airport security policies throughout the world are based on The International 
Civil Aviation Organization Annex 17, Standards and Recommended Practices, and 
security manual. The Aviation Security Plan of Action includes a Universal Security 
Audit Program based on Annex 17 standards. Although each program must be passed by 
a majority vote of all member states, none of these guidelines is compulsory until adopted 
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by local jurisdictions. Generally, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
requires international airports to adopt International Civil Aviation Organization security 
standards before allowing U.S. carrier service, and U.S. aviation regulations generally 
exceed these standards (Price & Forrest, 2009, pp. 85–91). 
In 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine changed the game by 
holding Israeli El Al Flight 426 hostage for five weeks. Israel set a risky precedent by 
releasing 16 convicted Arab prisoners to end the standoff (Thomas, 2008; World: Drama 
of the Desert, 1970). By 1970, in response to dramatically increasing fatalities and capital 
damage, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered air carriers to install “surveillance 
equipment” in high-risk airports and reinstituted the Federal Air Marshal Program (Peters 
& Woolley, 1970). In 1972, one hijacking occurred globally every five days, and two per 
month in the United States (Thomas, 2008). As a result, the Federal Aviation 
Administration issued emergency rules requiring the screening of all passengers and 
carry-on baggage. Two years later, police thwarted a plan to fly a DC-9 into the White 
House and Congress authorized sanctions against any country failing to meet 
International Civil Aviation Organization security standards. In 1977, William Landes 
calculated the number of hijackings probably deterred by screening from 1973 to 1976, 
and estimated the cost of preventing each at approximately $9 million (Landes, 1978).  
By the 1980s, further increases in aircraft bombing, hijacking, and violence 
toward Jewish and American passengers, along with the advent of real time news 
coverage, pressured authorities to address security threats more aggressively (Price 
2009). In 1985, 30 days after a U.S. sailor was executed on board a hijacked aircraft by 
Shiite Muslims, Congress mandated luggage be matched to passengers on high-risk 
international flights (Preston, 2005). Eight days after Pan Am 103 blew up over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, security x-rayed or hand screened all checked bags on U.S. 
carriers from Europe or the Middle East.  
Although the incidence of violence in air transportation diminished during the 
1990s, the Federal Aviation Administration estimated $3 million was lost each week in 
airport retail sales due to the restriction of concourse access to ticket holders. After the  
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first World Trade center bombing and the Oklahoma Federal Building attack in 1993, a 
300-foot vehicle free zone around terminals curtailed the primary source of airport 
revenue as customers parked offsite.  
Compared to other incidents of violence against the airline industry, the 
September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center had 
the greatest impact on civil aviation in the United States. Employers released over 
140,000 aviation employees as a direct result of the attack. Less than 11 days later, 
Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act of 2001, and 
authorized $10 billion in federal loan guarantees and $5 billion in grants to air carriers. 
Furthermore, it limited reparations for each family of the 9/11 victims to $1.6 million. On 
November 19, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001, which altered U.S. aviation security from top to bottom (Cobb & 
Primo, 2003). The federal government assumed full responsibility for civil aviation 
security, and transferred jurisdiction from the Federal Aviation Administration to the 
newly formed Transportation Security Administration, under the Department of 
Transportation.  
As quickly as the government created laws to mitigate new threats to aviation, 
industry, media, and customers found fault with the plans. In Beyond Fear, security guru 
Bruce Schneier claimed, “with the exception of reinforcing cockpit doors, passengers 
knowing they have to fight back, and sky marshals…” most aviation security is simply 
theater. Furthermore, he reasoned terrorists would now target the non-secured side of the 
security checkpoint (Schneier, 2003). 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office has noted that national transportation 
security standards are not being followed by the airline industry, that inadequate 
procedures are in place, and that security resources are allocated haphazardly (GAO, 
2010b). In 2010, the Government Accountability Office evaluation of how well the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) met National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan requirements suggested that the agency’s efforts to judge security methods were 
imprecise and disorganized (GAO, 2009). The Department of Homeland Security 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review was designed to help guide policies and 
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priorities for four years. The Government Accountability Office report on the first review 
identified stakeholder concerns over the lack of a national risk assessment and that the 
review was rushed, which further limited the ability of stakeholders to participate in the 
development and evaluation of metrics related to airline security(GAO Highlights, 2011).  
K. Jack Riley, Vice President of the National Security Research Division of the 
RAND Corporation, is an outspoken critic of national security policy. To quote a recent 
speech he delivered at the Airport Revenue News Conference, “One reason that we have 
ended up in the current situation is that security measures are grafted or layered on in 
response to specific incidents, with little regard to an integrated assessment of cost, 
effectiveness, and impact on risk” (Riley, 2011). Clearly, an overall assessment of airline 
security would be a starting point in allocating resources efficiently and in developing 
estimates of the effectivness of existing security procedures. 
Resource allocation and cost assessment are becoming increasingly more 
important as many airports are owned by states or cities with shrinking budgets. 
According to the non-profit think tank, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “For 
fiscal year 2013 … 29 states have projected or have addressed shortfalls totaling $47 
billion” (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2012). Municipalities are faring no 
better. In 2009, combined U.S. city budgets were running a three-year deficit that might 
have been as high as $83 billion (Hoene, 2009). Since 2009, this municipal economic 
outlook has not improved significantly. In 2011, the International Air Transport 
Association forecast a 78% drop in the airline industry’s profits, which equals a net profit 
of $4 billion and a profit margin of .07% (Smith, 2011). This results in significant 
economic incentives to provide a more effective and efficient security system. A 
structured comprehensive analysis of airline security could help achieve this objective.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and examine concepts and principles used 
in public administration and fire prevention that could be used to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of airport security policy and programs.  
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1. Primary Research Question 
• To what extent is commercial airport security currently measured and how 
could it be measured? 
To offer a comparative standard to evaluate the results indicated in the primary 
research question, this thesis attempts to answer the following set of secondary questions. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What recognized public administration performance metrics are relevant 
to aviation security? 
• Is the international fire safety consensus standard model relevant to 
aviation security? 
C. ARGUMENT 
Civil aviation contributes $900 billion to the U.S. economy, or 9% of the gross 
domestic product (Price & Forrest, 2009). The potential for economic loss and death 
caused by aviation terrorism has been the justification for billions of dollars expended on 
aviation security. These figures demonstrate the need for objective, reasonable 
management of public programs and resources. Competent management is contingent on 
the application of appropriate metrics. According to Tachi Kiuchi, the Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Mitsubishi Electric America, “Metrics are to a business what 
the five senses are to humans - systems of feedback that improve our capacity to adapt 
and excel over the long run” (Kiuchi, 2002). 
Performance measures have been a primary element of many result-oriented 
management systems. Frederick Taylor is considered one of the pioneers of industrial 
management because he proposed measuring workload, workflow, and worker efficiency 
as early as the 1890s. Although, 40 years earlier, the National Board of Fire Underwriters 
of the United States was formed and applied measures and standards to inaugurate a 
paradigm shift from accepting risk to managing risk (Brearley, 1916). In 1943, Clarence 
Ridley and Herbert Simon wrote Measuring Municipal Activities: A survey of Suggested 
Criteria for Appraising Administration for the International City Management 
Association. At approximately the same time, academia began debating the merits of 
“specific and measurable” goals or objectives (Morrison, 2010).  
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Pinkerton Government Services, the security provider for many public facilities, 
uses an “evaluation tool to document current performance, identify opportunities for 
improvement, and develop performance enhancement plans” (Maydoney, 2005) at over 
100 facilities in the United States. The plan uses percentage points from each evaluation 
transposed to a master scorecard based on weighted importance. The results are shared 
with all involved parties including management, supervision, and officers. The plan 
allows customers a detailed view of performance at all of their locations and answers the 
question, “Are we meeting your requirements?” (Maydoney, 2005) 
Pinkerton is hybrid organization in the sense it is a privately owned corporation 
but services government facilities, much the same as commercial airports are hybrid, 
publicly owned for-profit businesses. Therefore, public administration principles 
combined with performance measurement theory may well provide the tools necessary to 
ensure that aviation security adapts and improves. Nevertheless, to insure the analysis 
does not create more trouble or cost than value, the measurement system must be 
designed, implemented, and supported to serve very specific managerial needs. The 
litmus test has to be, “Does the organization improve over time?” (Poister, 2003) 
Interest in using metrics to judge public programs has also been translated into 
law. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 required all federal agencies 
to set goals and report annually on performance in an effort to address the absence of 
information on program outcomes. The Government Performance and Results 
Modernization Act of 2010 required more frequent reports and defined the performance 
framework more specifically (Kamensky, 2011). Forty-seven states legislate or mandate 
per executive order performance-based budgeting along with the necessary performance 
measures (Poister, 2003). Fire safety has a long history of measuring (and improving) 
system outcomes, establishing baseline standards, and converting those standards into 
law. As safety and security share many common objectives, numerous public safety 




Several factors that determine the consequences of a fire, such as building 
construction, occupant egress, and human behavior, are equally pertinent to the outcome 
of a terrorist incident. For example, deflagration is often a significant aspect of both fire 
and terrorism. Many lessons learned from the post analysis of major fires could be 
directly applicable to security planning.  
Aviation security and fire protection share several objectives and problems in 
common. The three primary goals of fire protection: life safety, property protection, and 
continuity of business operations, are inherent in security. Both fields face the challenge 
of measuring prevention (deterrence), and more specifically, collecting data concerning 
events that do not occur. The National Fire Protection Association has been involved in 
such analysis since the dawn of the industrial revolution (Grant, 1996), and as a result, 
developed a working relationship with the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology in 1914. Today, the National Institute of Standards and Technology Building 
and Fire Research Laboratory measures the effectiveness of building and fire codes, 
structural fire response, occupant behavior and egress, and aircraft impact damage, with 
some recent research directly related to 9/11 (Diamantes, 2011).  
These experiments quantitatively measure the probability of successfully 
mitigating specific threats with specific strategies. Statistically measuring the quality of 
service oriented programs like fire safety and security has always been more elusive. The 
evolution of modern fire service metrics may provide clues to improving performance 
measurement of aviation security.  
The first analysis of fire service performance began in 1916 by the Insurance 
Services Office, a voluntary, nonprofit association of insurance companies. The grading 
was and is still a comparative rating of communities’ ability to defend against major fires 
to set insurance rates. It classifies fire protection capability based on staffing, training, 
equipment, communications, and water supply, and assigns a minimum rating between 1, 
for excellent capability, and 10, for no fire protection whatever.  
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In the late 1980s, a fire department self-accreditation process was developed that 
involved new research and analysis, based on performance measures used in foreign fire 
services. Early findings indicated U.S. fire departments tracked and reported activity 
rather than performance, which was of relatively little value in operational improvement 
or strategic planning (Bruegman, 2012). Although most large fire departments have now 
made significant progress, many small and volunteer agencies still struggle with 
implementing meaningful performance metrics. One likely explanation is participation in 
the national data collection system is not mandatory. However, participating departments, 
in conjunction with the National Fire Protection Association have developed useful 
qualitative measures for fire safety programs.  
Researchers attempt to quantify risk by assessing the expected incident frequency 
and the severity of associated consequences. The two primary approaches to quantitative 
appraisal of fire safety are point schemes calibrated to acceptable standards and 
mathematical modeling calculating data in estimated ranges, which provide approximated 
conclusion (Spitzer, 2007). It is easier to address intangibles like “public good” and 
“political constraints” with statistical metrics, if key value drivers are identified. 
Performance measurement can be misdirected if not strongly related to mission.  
Although defining measure and collecting data are requisite to evaluating 
programs, the descriptive nature of measures must be differentiated from the appraisal 
function of a program evaluation (Poister, 2003, p. 12). Data must not be over 
interpreted. Balancing the number and focus of measures is crucial. Utilizing too many 
routine measures is a waste of time and resources, while incorporating the most relevant 
three or four measures can provide important insights into efficiency and effectiveness. 
As with all tools, performance measurement systems and data can be deliberately 
or perfunctorily misused. One common mistake is to prove rather than improve. 
Therefore, management must periodically assess the entire performance measurement 
system. Full commitment from management helps assure cooperation and availability of 
resources. It also is important to secure buy in from all pertinent stakeholders, as those 
who benefit from current policy or fear new technology may resist the new metrics. In an 
ideal system, all employees from top to bottom would participate in assessing how well 
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they meet organizational objectives. Employees already informally measure their own 
operation and understand how that performance compares with other processes. When 
employees are empowered to adapt measurements and take necessary corrective action, it 
minimizes the need for external feedback. 
Another measurement error involves confusing output with outcome. Output is 
the amount and quality of product or service rendered, often related to time or expense 
(efficiency), while outcome is the degree to which the objective and goals are met 
(effectiveness). To obtain a complete understanding of service, a measurement system 
must examine both effectiveness and efficiency. Otherwise, efficiency may be improved 
while effectiveness slips to an unacceptable level. For example, vehicle inspections may 
have reached a record unit per staff hour ratio, while decoy explosive devices missed per 
inspection has increased (Spitzer, 2007). Experience shows that the development of 
effective measurement is the best way to insure both organizational effectiveness and 
efficiency (Hatry, Blair, Fisk, Greiner, Hall, & Schaenman, 1992). The International City 
Management Association offers 10 suggestions for implementing a “system” to monitor 
effectiveness (Table 1). 
Performance measurement can define program service levels, contribute clarity of 
mission, and communicate program accomplishments to managers, customers, and 
policymakers. Measures can be used to plan and control programs at the operational level 
and a strategic level when indicators measure progress toward meeting goals and 
objectives, and how well strategy translates to action. 
Past Government Accountability Office reviews have outlined specific 
requirements for effective program evaluation, which include performance standards, 
clearly articulated methodology, and detailed data analysis. All three requirements can be 
addressed, provided a system is designed, implemented, and supported properly. While it 
may be challenging to design measurement addressing a particular management question 
based on the organization’s mission statement, articulated goals and objectives, and 
established standards, it is sometimes possible to extrapolate accepted standards created 
by recognized industry organizations as a relative measure, e.g., to compare operating 
costs of different model cars under emergency use and general purpose (Ammons, 2002).  
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Table 1.   International City Management Association Suggestions for Measuring 
Effectivness 
 
1)  Involve individual agencies at all stages of planning and implementation 
2)  Make the process positive, constructive, rewarding, and unthreatening as possible 
3)  Provide specific incentives for manager to participate 
4)  Provide central staff technical leadership and management support.  
5)  Maximize the utility and application by summarizing the finding concisely and 
clearly 
6)  Balance client-oriented outcomes measures and agency-oriented activity  
7)  Prioritize measuring. Begin with those outputs directly related to customer service 
8)  Institutionalize measurement activities. Incorporate measures in the budget 
process 
9)  Provide in advance for comprehensive discussion of the measures and procedures 
10)  Find champions, officials must be committed, reexamine procedures after 
implemented 
 
A performance measurement system generally consists of four components: 1) 
general management function, 2) data collection, 3) analysis, and 4) consequent action of 
decision making. Management is responsible for establishing the foundation by clearly 
communicating the strategic framework. Data collection/processing is often the most 
resource intense component because raw data has to be processed into statistical values, 
displayed in useful formats, and compiled in reports after verifying the reliability of the 
data and processing. The analysis component provides the context or framework and 
contrasts the data to something to create information and make understanding possible. 
Usually the primary indicator is performance over time. Nevertheless, other comparisons 
based on units, agencies, or benchmark performance measures can be constructive. 
Finally, an effective system is designed to improve performance; the information gained 
should be the basis of practical decision making and procedural change. All four 
components should reflect data driving performance.  
Performance measurement, however, should be only one consideration in the 
enhancement process. Further comprehensive evaluations may be justified based on the 
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results of the analysis. Management must support a performance measurement system 
over the long term. Evolution via testing on a small scale, revision to meet changing 
needs, and institution-wide adoption takes time. The temptation to seek a magic bullet 
measure should be resisted, as measurement is a continuous process of trial, discovery, 
and innovation, which involves nontraditional concepts (Spitzer, 2007).  
 13 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review of literature related to aviation security includes historic/technical 
text and articles, government policy directive-documents and reports, academic research 
and books, and literature concerning general management, public administration, and 
performance measurement principles. The main objective is to discover patterns or trends 
in the writings that will facilitate better understanding of past practices, current 
applications, and potential future direction of aviation security. 
A. HISTORIC/TECHNICAL TEXT AND ARTICLES 
Although aviation security has been a policy issue for well over half a century, the 
study of the topic is relatively new. Overall, technical readings provide a general 
background of airport security challenges, as well as issues in the planning and 
implementation of security programs. Some of the writing is critical of administrative 
policy before and after 9/11, and takes exception to an apparent lack of unity in strategy 
and execution. Several authors suggest steps to correct some of these perceived 
deficiencies.  
The first edition of the earliest text specifically dedicated to airport security was 
written in 1976 (Moore, 1991). Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security was a technical 
instruction text for airport security officers. This book covers the history of skyjacking, 
terrorism, and the reactive policies of the U.S. and international governments, up through 
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. It categorized different options for 
securing aircraft and airport facilities, including fencing, lighting, employee 
identification, law enforcement, and contingency planning. The brief final chapter, 
“Control by Audit and Survey,” outlined a self-help security evaluation for airfreight 
carriers. 
Eight years after 9/11, Jeffery Price and Jeffery Forrest released a more up-to-date 
technical airport security manual for practitioners, Practical Aviation Security, Practicing 
and Preventing Future Threats. It covered more up-to-date national policies and  
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regulations and included a detailed chapter on 9/11 and the 9/11 Commission Report 
(Price & Forrest, 2009). Both these books provide an overview of general procedures 
involved in securing airports against criminal and terrorist activity.  
In his book on Aviation Security, Bartholomew Elias, an aviation policy specialist 
for the Congressional Research Service and a research psychologist for the U.S. Air 
Force, found fault with four areas in the National Strategy for Aviation Security. He 
believes it does not effectively: 1) define the methodology for evaluating risk and 
carrying out the strategy, 2) document necessary costs and resources, 3) explain roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination of nonfederal stakeholders, and 4) show how the 
various components relate to national security, homeland security and various other 
counterterrorism strategies (Elias, 2010, p. 130). 
Several books explore specific aviation events and facilities and offer different 
interpretations of related security strategies. In The Plane Truth: Airline Crashes, the 
Media, and Transportation Policy, Roger Cobb and David Primo explore three accidents: 
USAir flight 427 (September 1994), ValuJet flight 592 (May 1996), and TWA flight 800 
(July 1996) to illustrate how regulatory agencies and Congress reacted to high-profile 
events with incoherent policy (Cobb & Primo, 2003). Soon after 9/11, Gunnar Kuepper, 
Chief of Operations for Emergency & Disaster Management Inc., developed a four-part 
system to assure a proper security strategy, including hazard and threat identification, 
impact analysis and risk assessment, operational experiences, and cost-benefit studies 
(Kuepper, 2004).  
Some authors explore the value of incorporating security strategy in building 
architecture. In Designing Airports for Security: An Analysis of Proposed Changes at 
LAX, the Rand Corporation illustrates how airport design as a function of security should 
consider the effects of attacks before they occur, as in how many casualties an attack 
would cause, and how an attack would affect operations. By reducing the consequences 
of a terrorist attack, it is possible to make it less attractive to the potential perpetrators. 
Small changes in airport procedures or design can have a major effect on the perceived 
value of an attack to the terrorist. The length of time passengers spend in line is 
important, because moving people through ticketing, checkpoints, and baggage claim 
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more rapidly reduces risk (Schell, Chow, & Grammich, 2003). Kennedy International 
Airport designed the Jet Blue Terminal #5 with security in mind from inception. The 
security checkpoint is 340 feet wide, which allows passengers to pass through in less than 
10 minutes (Dunlap, 2008). 
Seeming nonrelated experts argue that relating security to other perspectives can 
help improve homeland security. In Beyond Fear, Bruce Schneier draws an analogy 
between information technology security and aviation security. His five suggested 
questions to analyze a security system appear in Table 2 (Schneier, 2003). He also 
explains how security is both a reality and a feeling that requires different strategies to 
address each, and that all strategies involve subjective tradeoffs (Schneier, 2003). Roger 
Grimes in Computer Security’s Dubious Future points out how complexity inhibits 
security and makes it easier for an enemy to discover the system’s Achilles heel. He 
quotes Carl von Clausewitz, “As a principle of war, a defender must defend against every 
possible assault, but an assailant only need exploit a single vulnerability” (Grimes, 2008). 
These perspectives may be instances of the proverbial “thinking outside the box.”  
Table 2.   How to Analyze a Security System  
 1.  What assets are you trying to protect?  
 2.  What are the risks to those assets?  
 3.  How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?  
 4.  What other risks does the security solution cause?  
 5.  What cost and tradeoffs does the security solution impose? 
 
B. GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES AND POLICY 
National and homeland security policy seemed to evolve extremely quickly 
following 9/11, although not necessarily in a unified manner. Some critics felt more early 
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stakeholder input would have strengthened policy implementation. Although, time was 
obviously of the essence, and some proposed components of the National Aviation 
Security Strategy still have not been completed 10 years after 9/11. These documents help 
understand how the federal government’s philosophy evolved aviation security strategy.  
In February 2001, George W. Bush began the administration of executive security 
policy with National Security Presidential Directives, beginning with National Security 
Presidential Directive 1, Organization of the National Security Council System. After 
9/11, he used Homeland Security Presidential Directives for homeland security policy. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1 outlined the operation of the Homeland 
Security Council. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, Defeating the Terrorist 
Threat to the United States, released four days before Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 1, basically declared war on the al-Qaeda network.  
The federal government seemed to change the size, or at least the organization, of 
national infrastructure periodically. On December 3, 2003, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 superseded Presidential Decision Directive 63, which was issued 
three years before 9/11. Both defined essential national systems and assets deemed 
susceptible to terrorist attack and organized the protection of critical infrastructure and 
key resource. Presidential Decision Directive 63 listed eight critical infrastructure sectors 
while the National Strategy for Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets lists 
11 sectors. The 2007 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan outlined 17 sectors.  
An updated version of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, released in 
January 2009, directed each national infrastructure sector to create a working group 
comprised of members from Government Coordinating Councils and private Sector 
Coordinating Councils. The working groups were tasks with creating sector specific plans 
incorporating the eight steps of the System-Based Risk Management process, in the 





Figure 3.   System-Based Risk Management Process (From: Department of Homeland 
Security 2007) 
In June 2006, National Security Presidential Directive 47 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 16 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to collaborate with 
essential agencies and stakeholders to create and implement a National Strategy for 
Aviation Security. Released by the White House in March 2007, this strategy is broadly 
 18 
based on three objectives: 1) using the full range of assets and capabilities available to 
prevent the terrorist acts in the air domain, 2) insuring the safe and efficient use of the air 
domain, and 3) facilitating travel and commerce (National Strategy for Aviation Security, 
2007). 
Later that year, the Department of Homeland Security began creating a set of 
supporting plans to the National Strategy for Aviation Security that provide a situational 
framework for implementing the core strategy before, during, and after possible terrorist 
events (Figure 4). The first three plans address day-to-day security measures and 
programs to reduce aviation sector vulnerability to terrorist or criminal acts. The Aviation 
Transportation System Security Plan is focused on identifying and vetting customers, 
contractors, and employees of the aviation transportation system. It also addresses 
preventing use of the system as a weapon, and hardening critical elements of the system 
against other forms of attack. The Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration 
Plan coordinates the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to appropriate 
stakeholders, which thereby enhances the system security plan. Worldwide, the 
International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan and the International Outreach Plan guide 




Figure 4.   Supporting Plans to the National Strategy for Aviation Security  
The Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan is activated once a terrorist or 
criminal attack occurs, which facilitates immediate actions to mitigate a wide range of 
possible security threats. This plan is augmented by the Domestic Outreach Plan, which 
outlines communication with state, local, and tribal government, as well as the private 
sector, to bring their resources into play. Finally, the Aviation Transportation System 
Recovery Plan is being developed to facilitate the aviation sector’s continuity of 
operations and minimize economic impact after a terrorist event (Elias, 2010). 
C. CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS 
This thesis references numerous U.S. Government Accountably Office Reports, 
Congressional Research Service Reports, and Congressional Staff Reports. The 
Government Accountably Office supplies Congress with independent analysis of 
government programs and activities according to the Budget and Accounting Act of 
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1921. These reports include generic recommendations and options and follow up analysis 
on the extent and results of proposals being implemented. The Congressional Research 
Service is a branch of the Library of Congress that does policy research for members of 
Congress, congressional committees, and staff. Finally, legislative staffers conduct 
research and analysis on policy issues and assist in designing and implementing strategies 
to accomplish the legislative goals of their members of Congress. It needs to be noted that 
all these reports are subject to political influence and should be interpreted accordingly.  
Fifteen Government Accountably Office reports were reviewed for this thesis, 
beginning with the Aviation Safety and Security—Challenges to Implementing the 
Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, 
released March 5, 1997. Nearly every report recommended a “comprehensive strategy” 
with “clear goals and objectives, measureable performance criteria…, (and) a monitoring, 
evaluation, and reporting system…” (Dillingham, 1997). 
From 2007 to 2009, the Government Accountably Office evaluated how well the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) complied with the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan directive to access risk and improve airport perimeter security. Its 
conclusion found the administration’s effort to measure security according to cost, 
benefit, and impact was imprecise and disorganized. TSA contended it would address this 
process with a systems-based approach in the near future. Furthermore, the Government 
Accountably Office noted “limited usefulness” of TSA’s past efforts due to the lack of 
adequate goals or objectives, milestones, and documentation and recommended designing 
and implementing an analysis process based on accepted risk management and public 
administration principles. It also indicated the need for a national strategy specifically 
focused on making airport security decisions (GAO, 2009). 
The latest Government Accountably Office report referenced was an audit of the 
first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, released in September of 2011. It noted the 
Department of Homeland Security had not yet conducted a National Risk Assessment and 
that many stakeholder participants felt the process had been rushed, which limited their 
input (GAO Highlights, 2011). 
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Five Congressional Research Service reports were included in this literature 
reviewed. The Homeland Security Act of 2002: Legislative History and Pagination Key 
included a brief history of the incidents and processes preceding the passage of the act. 
The National Aviation Security Policy, Strategy, and Mode-Specific Plans: Background 
and considerations for Congress, released in 2009, summarized the National Strategy for 
Aviation Security for members of Congress, which suggested five areas for further 
congressional investigation (Table 3) (Elias, 2008). 
Table 3.   Suggested Congressional Investigations 
 1) Underlying Risk Assumptions 
 2)  Security System Sustainability 
 3)  Reactive Planning 
 4)  Comprehensive Security Framework 
 5)  Budgetary Alignment 
 
D. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
According to management authority, Peter Drucker, whether an organization is a 
private for-profit business, a non-profit charity, or a government institution, it must 
employee specific management principles to be effective. Examining these principles 
should help determine the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities of current aviation 
security. To quote Drucker, “Management is the specific and distinguishing organ of any 
and all organizations.” He also notes the most important management responsibility is to 
create “targets and yardsticks,” enabling employees to know how well they have 
achieved organizational objectives (Peter F. Drucker Literary Trust, 2008). In 
Reinventing Government, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler wrote, “If you don’t measure 




Most of the books and articles concerning metrics of public and government 
organizations were written after World War II. Nevertheless, early analyses of industrial 
productivity began with Frederick Taylor’s reports of time-and-motion studies done in 
1881. Taylor referred to his theories as “Scientific Management,” which was designed to 
reduce work and eliminate waste (Peter F. Drucker Literary Trust, 2008). 
In Airport Security, High Reliability and the Problem of Rationality, George 
Frederickson and Todd LaPorte relate how the principles of high–reliability organizations 
could apply to airport security operations. Contemporary decision theory, based on the 
study of error-tolerant organizations and nearly error-free operations could, in theory, 
improve air travel security. They examine numerous innovative management concepts 
including the value of high technical competence, sustained performance, decentralized 
authority, and rewarding employees that discover and correct errors (LaPorte & 
Frederickson, 2002).  
The International City/County Management Association has been actively 
involved in measuring performance for since the late 1980s (Hatry et al., 1992). They 
recommend measuring fire department effectiveness by collecting and comparing loss 
data over time and across similar communities, then correcting for external variables, 
such as socio-economic circumstances. Similar adjustments may be prudent when 
applying aviation security metrics. One Government Accountability Office report noted 
an issue with  TSA not accounting for different categories of airports or employee 
numbers in the design criteria of employee security pilot programs (GAO, 2009).  
E. ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
Some academics maintain, “If you can’t measure it, it does not exist” (Brown 
2010). Scientific methodology can obviously play a large part in comparing and 
contrasting specific aspects of security strategy and implementation. Once again, 
however, politics may have some influence and should be considered when interpreting 
academic research concerning strategy.  
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Norman Schneidewind applied statistical risk analysis to airport security by using 
randomized hypothetical and factual data, and compensated with sensitivity analysis to 
understand airport security better. He attempted to identify weak points, such as the 
“passenger flow through the ticket counter, security station, and gate,” and quantify the 
probability of detecting terrorists at each location. The model could possibly help 
evaluate systemic changes in security policy (Schneidewind, 2006). 
Economists Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther used an analogy of airport 
security to address risk analysis with the Nash equilibrium gaming model. They 
demonstrated how action taken by any participant affects risk to all participants. This 
research may have application in the international outreach element of the Aviation 
Security Plan (Kunreuthe & Heal, 2007).  
Another article in the same journal evaluated the cost effectiveness of using one 
versus two baggage-screening devices. Dr. Qianmei Feng, a fellow with the University of 
Houston, used probability theory and statistical optimization to conclude, “A two-device 
baggage-screening system should be deployed rather than a single-device system, as a 
properly arranged two-device system outperforms a single-device system in terms of the 
level of security and cost effectiveness” (Feng 2007). This research indicated the 
increased reliability justifies the investment in multiple systems. It may be possible to 
extrapolate this conclusion into other security components. 
In their article, “Is this Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in 
Counterterrorism,” Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel ask, “How open should 
government be when aggressive non-state actors seek to take advantage of information 
shared in the name of good governance or the public’s right to know?” To answer this, 
they surveyed 186 U.S. federal, state, local, and industry homeland security officials. The 
survey included a simple open-ended question: “How do you think about the tradeoff 
between secrecy and openness in Homeland Security?” and several questions to measure 
how respondents perceived specific variables related to “Strategic Information Release.” 
Shapiro and Siegel determined, “information sharing can improve the efficiency of 
protective spending” and “much more attention should be paid to how openness can help 
government identify vulnerabilities” (Shapiro & Siegel, 2010). 
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U-map, an area of academic research focused on transparency, has potential use in 
data analysis of security. It is an ongoing project in Europe used to classify and compare 
higher education institutions. U-Map employs sunburst charts to compare information 
about universities, which makes it easy to understand and compare institutions. The 
charts present statistics in six major categories: teaching and learning, student profiles, 
knowledge exchange, international orientation, research involvement, and regional 
engagement. The chart further subdivides each category, which are measured in broad 
general ranges (See Figure 5). For instance, teaching and learning includes subject areas 
covered (measured as comprehensive, broad, specialized, and none), degrees level focus, 
orientation of degree, and expenditures on teaching. The interactive website allows 
researchers to drill down easily, which facilitates decision making (Center for Higher 
Education Policy Studies, 2008).  
 
University “A”     University “B” 
    
Figure 5.   U-Map Sunburst Charts 
F. FIRE PREVENTION LITERATURE 
David Rasbash looked at fire safety from an engineering perspective in 
Evaluation of Fire Safety. He attempted to quantify risk, or evaluate the potential of 
a hazard by distinguishing the expected frequency of an event and the severity of 
the associated consequences to compare the costs of fire with other hazards, the 
expense of mitigation and control, as well as the value and tradeoffs of designed 
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safety. To illustrate how fire safety interacts with other hazards, the theoretical 
maximum fire safety benefit “A” considering other hazards, is calculated with the 
following equation: A=(ƒd +ƒc)-(hd + hc), with “ƒd” being the detriment (direct 
and indirect costs) caused by a fire, “ƒc” the cost (dollars, time, and inconvenience) 
of fire safety, “hd” the detriment of other hazards, and “hc” being the cost of other 
hazard prevention. Obviously, many of these values are not easily quantified. 
Rasbash believes fire is the “most complex phenomenon occurring in nature” and 
suggests a 20-step process to design a fire safety program (Table 4). He also 
outlines two quantitative approaches to evaluating fire safety, point schemes, 
referred to as rating schemes, and mathematical modeling (Rasbash, Ramachandran, 
Kandola, Watts, & Law, 2004). 
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Table 4.   Steps to Design a Fire Safety Program (From: Rasbash et al., 2004)  
1 .   Define the fire hazard area. 
1 a .   Identify people, property, and processes at risk from fire and explosion 
incidents within the fire hazard area. 
2 .   Define the fire safety objectives. 
3 .   Assess materials that can burn. 
4 .   Assess sources of ignition. 
5 .   Assess the conditions of fire spread that would lead to an established fire. 
6 .   Assess agents that cause fire (i.e., that bring 3, 4, 5 together). 
7 .   Estimate the probability of fires being caused. 
8 .   Assess the means available of limiting fire, (1) active means (2) passive 
means. 
9 .   Estimate the courses of fire behavior. 
1 0 .   Assess the harmful agents produced by fires and their capacity to harm 
people and property 
1 1 .   Estimate the production and range of action of harmful agents produced 
by fires. 
1 2 .   Assess methods of protection against the harmful agents. 
1 3 .   Estimate the direct detriment to people and property that may be caused by 
fires. 
1 4 .   Assess available methods of protecting people and processes from the 
indirect effects caused by direct detriment. 
1 5 .   Estimate indirect detriment. 
1 6 .   Judge whether estimated direct and indirect detriment comply with fire 
safety objectives. If Step 16 shows that the objectives of fire safety are not 
met, then carry out the following steps. 
1 7 .   Postulate changes in the fire safety situation, for example in the 
precautions taken. 
1 8 .   Estimate the effect of changes on achievement of fire safety objectives. 
1 9 .   Define an acceptable method of achieving objectives, taking into account 
cost and convenience. 
2 0 .  Formulate and express fire safety requirements. 
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In Fire Protection Engineering magazine, Arthur E. Cote explained how after a 
particularly notorious high-rise fire in New York City, the General Services 
Administration convened an international conference in 1971 to consider standards for 
high-rise building fire protection systems. The conference also articulated the need for a 
“total systems concepts approach” to fire safety that resulted in the National Fire 
Protection Association creating the 550 standard and the Fire Safety Concepts Tree 
(Figure 6). The tree outlines two methods to achieve fire safety objectives by first 
preventing fire, and second, managing the fire impact by mitigating the fire and/or 
securing the exposed people and property (Cote, 2008). 
 
Figure 6.   Fire Safety Concepts Tree 
G. CONCLUSION  
While an abundance of literature is relevant to airport security, and much of it 
calls for measuring outcomes, the actual structure and application of assessing the 
relative effectiveness of security still seems less than robust. The goal of this thesis is to 




consensus standard model to guide aviation security. The literature suggests these 
systems may be compatible with the System Based Risk Management framework and the 
flexibility and randomness strategy to reduce potential terrorist exploitation. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. OVERVIEW 
The methodology employed in this thesis borrows from policy analysis and 
formative program evaluation. The purpose is to investigate how airport security 
programs and policies are being evaluated and how those evaluation processes could be 
improved. The extensive literature review provided a sense of the current status of 
scholarship in this area, as well an opportunity to identify smart practices used in fire 
safety. The research component of this thesis is qualitative and employs a two round 
Delphi survey of 10 members of the Transportation Security Services Committee of the 
American Association of Airport Executives. This methodology is suitable to answer the 
research questions, as members of this committee are recognized subject matter experts 
in the field of airport security, and as a body, help develop policy recommendations for 
TSA. 
Sixty-seven members of the committee were contacted by phone and asked to 
participate in the survey. Thirty-eight agreed to read the first round and the three 
questions along with informed consent forms were emailed to them. Ten members 
responded to the first round of the survey. After summarizing and analyzing the answers, 
the questions for the second round were formulated. The summaries and unidentified 
individual responses were emailed back to the respondents along with the three questions 
of the second round, to which seven members responded. The anonymous responses of 
both rounds are included in the appendix. The summaries are included in the Analysis 
and Findings chapter.  
B. SURVEY 
1. Round One Survey Questions 
1.  What criteria do you currently use to judge the efficiency and 
effectiveness of your security policy and procedures? 
2.  Which criteria do you consider most useful and why? 
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3.  What metrics pertaining to security policy or procedures would you like to 
see employed? 
2. Round Two Survey Questions 
1. According to the first round, there is an apparent desire and willingness to 
share security performance data. Do you believe a secure web based, 
professional network, dedicated to airport security information sharing, 
would be feasible and worth the effort? Why? 
2.  Is the International Civil Aviation Organization Security Audit Program a 
valuable tool? Why? 
3.  Considering the concerns and ideas expressed in the survey’s first round, 
what methods would best help determine how to allocate security 
resources? Why? 
C. LIMITS OF THE EMPLOYED METHODOLOGY 
The results of these surveys should be compared and interpreted with some slight 
to moderate uncertainty. Not all the responses were entirely candid, as demonstrated by 
some of the qualified answers. In addition, the survey population was fairly limited, 
possibly due to security concerns of the potential participants, and finally, no adjustment 
was made for the contributing airport’s operational differences.  
The original methodology chosen was interviewing the Security Managers at 
airports selected according to similar demographics. However, it became apparent very 
early that the lack of cooperation would mandate a different process. The Delphi survey 
was substituted. However, the survey presented a comparable challenge. Shortly after 
sending out the surveys, the TSA called and inquired about who had been contacted, the 
purpose of the survey, and the nature of the research credentials. TSA directed to stop 
further surveys, until they verified the validity of the research. One week later, 
authorization to continue was granted, with the caveat that all participants had been 
advised to seek TSA clarification before divulging any potentially sensitive security 
information. The implication for this and future research is that less than full transparency 
or complete data makes it difficult to improve public safety policy.  
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D. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION 
The results of the literature review and surveys will be combined to design a 
recommended performance measurement system for one aspect of airport security. It will 
be aligned with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and System Based Risk 
Management and will consider relevant national standards, local factors and criteria, and 
established public safety measurement concepts that can be adapted. The process will 
involve defining, evaluating and selecting the proper performance indicators and 
methodology, with a focus on creative thinking, seeking new knowledge, avoiding 
metricizing, and maximizing utility, while addressing skepticism.  
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IV. ANALYSIS/FINDINGS 
A. ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the results of the survey are analyzed by categorizing, comparing, 
and graphing the responses to help illustrate key findings. Specific comments and phrases 
from the participants are included in quotes when relevant. The complete survey results 
are presented in the appendix. When relevant, the analysis is compared with appropriate 
fire safety evaluation concepts and contemporary performance measurement theory 
gathered from the literature review. 
Only 10 of the 68 members of the American Association of Airport Executives 
Transportation Security Services Committee responded to the first round of the survey 
and seven responded to the second round. The limitations of the survey are noted in the 
methodology chapter.  
1. First Round Survey 
• Question #1. What criteria do you currently use to judge the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Airport security policies and programs? 
Participants listed a moderate range of measures, including calculating average 
times passengers wait in lines, assessing financial expenditure per passenger for security 
programs, and operational losses due to security events. This question yielded 34 data 
segments, which were classified into six basic categories. Four segments fit in multiple 
categories (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.   What Criteria Do You Currently Use to Judge the Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of Airport Security Policies and Programs? 
The 15 (39%) segments in the primary category, “Audits,” referred to any activity 
related to a formal examination or systematic checks, including checklist, quantified tests, 
or exercise results. It may be noteworthy that only one respondent mentioned the 
International Civil Aviation Organization Security Audit Program.  
The second most common category, “Events” included all activities related to 
security violations or breaches, which occurred 14 times (36%). This category could be 
subdivided into number of events or items confiscated and times required to respond to 
and assess security incidents.  
Human factors, “People” were included as the chosen metric four times (10.53%), 
either as the number of employees or passengers screened, employees issued badges, the 
time required to do so, or the cost per passenger. Cost per passenger also fit in the 
category of “Cost,” which included money spent or resources expended, and was 
mentioned twice (5.26%). 




(2.63%) each and incorporated expert experience and allowed for differences in the type 
of airport. While not specific metric activities, because they were significant filters, both 
were included in the analysis.  
Comparing apples to oranges will not provide useful metrics. The differences in 
physical layout of airport access and critical resources, or the number of passengers and 
employees can dramatically affect the value of particular mitigation strategies. Several 
respondents raised this issue in answering question #3. Furthermore, the nuances of these 
variances will often only be obvious to individuals with direct practical experience in 
aviation operations and security.  
• Question #2. Which of these do you consider most useful and why? 
This question attempted to determine how certain metrics are considered more 
productive. The participants indicated 12 “most useful” security criteria that were 
condensed into four subject categories using the same definitions as question one. Again, 
some answers fit into multiple categories. The 13 associated justification categories were 
abridged into five groups. (One category was nil or no justification) 
The chart in Figure 8 indicates the relative weight of each criterion by the size of 
the text box, and the related reasons via connecting arrows. The criteria categories appear 
in the left column and the associated reasons in the right. The category “Cost” referred to 
a measurement criterion and a reason to gauge security, and therefore, occurred in both 
columns. Participant “F” justified analyzing “regulatory compliance” as a way to “reduce 
financial risk.” While, “I” specified computing “cost per boarded passenger and 
operational costs to tenants…is a basic measure of efficiency.” (Note: this participant 
also noted three other methods as “Most Useful”)  
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Figure 8.   Which of These Do You Consider Most Useful and Why? 
“Audit” was by far the most popular criterion, (8), although the International Civil 
Aviation Organization Security Audit Program only came up once and did not relate to 
any justifications. The participant possibly felt it was self-explanatory. Half of the 
“Audit” responses (4) related to “Identifying Gaps.” This justification elicited the most 
responses (8). The other 50% was equally distributed, one each to the remaining four 
justification categories, customer service, establishing benchmarks, cost, and nil. 
Respondent “I” split the justification between “cost” and “Identifying Gaps.”  
Monitoring security “Events” was the second most prevalent category. It included 
three responses that were all related to “Identifying Gaps.” Customer Service was the 
second most prevailing justification with two responses, one related to “Audit” and the 




The overwhelming majority of survey participants felt some type audit procedure 
should be used to identify gaps in the security system. In addition, the “Audit” criterion 
was related to every justification category. Furthermore, every criterion with the 
exception cost was validated as most useful because they could identify gaps in security.  
• Question # 3 What metrics pertaining to security policy or procedures 
would you like to see employed? Why? 
The third question was designed to direct participants beyond current applications 
and encourages original thought. One responder actually alluded to innovation as 
“operators taking initiative”… (If not) “Penalized by TSA.” A word cloud, shown in 
Figure 9, was employed to analyze the six most frequent terms in the responses.  
 
Figure 9.   What Metrics … Would You Like to See Employed?  
The most common significant word, “System” was used 11 times. A review of the 
ideas associated with this term indicated the respondents thought overall security 
included many components working together in a “system. Furthermore, those 
components could be measured in some meaningful way. Although two of the 
respondents were not convinced that the quality of security could be quantified 
effectively, they still felt the “system” should be analyzed whenever possible. The  
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resistance to metrics was based on the possibility expert analysis would be more apt to 
discover gaps in the system and changing situations could negate investment in specific 
programs.  
The term “Program” referred to individual components within the security 
“system” and was the second most used significant word, and occurred nine times. 
(Including the plural form) For example, “Public and employee security awareness 
programs.” The primary knowledge gained from examining the use of this term was each 
component should be evaluated separately as it is likely competing with other “programs” 
for limited resources.  
The fifth rank was a three-way tie with “Public,” “Training,” and “TSA,” each 
garnering seven uses. A single respondent used the term “Public” seven times. The first 
three referred to “public safety personnel,” and the latter four to the value of developing 
and monitoring “public awareness” programs. In addition, only one respondent 
mentioned “training” but he used it seven times. He not only felt it was important to 
document and evaluate security related training, but suggested the use of technology 
could vastly improve training.  
Three respondents recommended “TSA” record, catalog, and share data about 
security events with individual airports to improve local security analysis. One reply 
suggested, “TSA” … “employ threat assessment and risk analysis,” but adjust the 
analysis for each different category of airports. 
“Categories” of airports was ranked sixth, and was mentioned five times 
(including the singular). Three respondents referred to comparing metrics according to 
the “category” of airports. Two indicated a need for standards or benchmarks because, 
“programs… (vary) greatly by airport even within a category and thus comparisons are 
difficult.” 
Although “audit” or “testing” did not appear in the word cloud, two participants 
mentioned them. Other suggestions included comparing the quantity and use of security 
personnel, systems, training, and equipment.  
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2. Second Round Survey 
• Question # 4 According to the first round, there is an apparent desire and 
willingness to share security performance data. Do you believe a secure 
web based, professional network, dedicated to airport security information 
sharing, would be feasible and worth the effort? Why? 
The participants were affirmative and unanimous that sharing data was feasible 
and valuable. Nevertheless, when responding to the “why” sharing data was desirable, the 
participants raised four types of concerns: utility, responsibility, credibility, and security. 
Utility encompassed analysis or “connecting the dots,” benchmarking, and working in 
“real time. Responsibility referred to who would “host the website.” Credibility denoted a 
potential lack of trust, which referred to data from stakeholders. Security was also related 
to trust. However, rather than questioning the data, it referred to the ability of 
stakeholders to maintain the secrecy of analysis products. Although the survey results 
indicated solidarity to the concept of sharing, the ideas about application were extremely 
lopsided.  
Utility was raised nine times when the three components were summed, which 
may be an indication that the respondents believed it was important to incorporate 
analysis of the data by as many participants as possible, compare the findings, and use the 
best to set standards. Furthermore, as terrorists are always looking to take advantage of 
gaps in security, noting “patterns” possibly connected to “events” or “significant dates” 
could be extremely “time relevant.” The graph (Figure 10) indicates responses by the 
individual components, “benchmarking” (4), “analysis” (3), and “real-time” (2).  
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Figure 10.   Why a Secure Web-Based, Professional Network, Dedicated to Airport 
Security Information Sharing, Would Be Feasible and Worth the Effort?  
Those concerned about “responsibility” seemed to indicate stakeholders needed to 
participate. One participant suggested an airport operators association, for instance, the 
American Association of Airport Executives should be involved in sharing data. Two 
recommended that TSA should “publish metrics…in conjunction with stakeholders.” One 
reported TSA already has a “SSI” protected website. “Responsibility” was the second 
highest response with a total of four.  
“Credibility” placed third with three respondents expressing doubt about data 
obtained voluntary. The National Fire Protection Association has a similar problem, as 
discretionary reporting participation is less than half the fire departments in the country, 
which yields conclusions based on estimated numbers. Although in general, the fire 
service believes national fire reporting data accurately indicates trends, this survey seems 
to show respondents think aviation security should be held to a higher standard. 
Only two respondents mentioned “Security.” One survey participant believed 
possible distrust by federal authorities would minimize any value, as stakeholders would 
be denied access to sensitive security information. Another participant recommended 
requiring security clearance before allowing access to the shared platform.  
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This question overwhelmingly received optimistic answers. Everyone thought 
information sharing would be beneficial. Three separate benefits were mentioned. 
Although two separate problems were raised, both were related to trust and the proposed 
solutions seemed relatively simple and logical. 
• Question # 5 Is the International Civil Aviation Organization Security 
Audit Program a valuable tool?  
Only two participants expressed personal knowledge and understanding of the 
program, but they disagreed as to the value of the program. One stated it was “too broad” 
for local airport operators security programs, while the other called it “the baseline of 
security elements.” This second respondent also suggested that it had significant “Gaps.” 
A third participant believed that the International Civil Aviation Organization security 
audit was a good fit for U.S. airports, but his nonspecific reasoning indicated a lack of 
direct experience with it. The other four respondents indicated they were “unfamiliar with 
it” or had “not worked” with it. Although, one had looked it up on line before responding 
and thought it would be a “good starting point.” Finally, one had used another audit “that 
was developed locally.” See Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   Is the International Civil Aviation Organization Security Audit Program a 
Valuable Tool?  
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• Question # 6 Considering the concerns and ideas expressed in the survey’s 
first round, what methods would best help determine how to allocate 
security resources?  
“Assessment” was by far the most popular method chosen. Four participants 
referred to risk analysis or vulnerability assessment, which likely meant the 
comprehensive TSA risk assessment for airport security was based on the risk 
management framework in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. However, two of 
the four participants in this category qualified their answers by suggesting using national 
and local components of risk assessment to allocate resources. One other participant 
referred to differences based on “areas of the country.” In this question, this type 
response was listed as “Adjust.” 
Systematic examination of other kinds of data, such as “analysis of operational 
losses” or “covert testing,” is included in the “Audit” category. Only one participant 
stated that “Audit” methods were best. This person also had the only response related to 
cost-benefit analysis, and also included “employee security awareness programs” as a 
good way to determine resource allocation. This response may indicate, however, that the 
question was misunderstood and meant it would be good to allocate resources to this 
program. One participant indicated an “intelligence network” that included more than 
aviation events would be a good way to regulate resource allocation, which is categorized 
as “Network.” Figure 12 illustrates the answers.  
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Figure 12.   What Methods Would Best Help Determine How to Allocate Security 
Resources?  
B. FINDINGS 
To what extent is commercial airport security currently measured and how should 
it be measured? While low hanging data is significant, what is missing can often provide 
just as much or more important insight. This survey indicated the primary concerns of 
security practitioners are currently audits, breeches, regulatory compliance, and 
information sharing. However, the data did not reflect considerations that management 
theory would seem to indicate belong in a discussion of security metrics. Technology (or 
dependence on), objectives (mission), and management are important issues in the 
execution of security strategies. When compared to contemporary management and 
performance measurement theory, what do these patterns and anomalies suggest? 
Based on the survey results, it can be assumed that today most, if not all 
commercial airports, primarily use audits that should include assessment of statutory and 
code compliance, and security breech statistical reporting, to gauge the effectiveness of 
security. While the survey did not address specific mechanics of audit and breech reports, 
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it is likely these measures consider output and outcome components, and are therefore, 
necessary and important tools to indicate how well some parts of the multilayered 
strategy work. Hopefully, these measures are customized to each facility and process to 
some extent that would increase reliability and utility. Future research should facilitate 
adaption and improvement of these types of measures.  
Many numerous explanations may exist as to why a number of significant factors 
were not mentioned in the survey. Although the study did not directly address comparing 
security technology, objectives, or management, these topics may be measured in most 
audit processes. Nevertheless, it seems odd that none of the respondents believed these 
issues important enough to mention specifically. The respondents may have assumed a 
consensus exists as to what “successful” security should look like, and linking 
measurements to mission or management was redundant. However, the literature review 
indicates a significant divergence of what may be considered good security. At the same 
time, the literature illustrates that a clear understanding of mission is critical to 
developing and using appropriate measurements. “Identify organizational mandates” and 
“Clarify organizational mission and values” are steps two and three in John Bryson’s 
“Ten Step Strategic Planning Process” (Bryson, 2004, p. 32). In Measuring Performance 
in Public and Nonprofit Organizations, Theodore Poister considers mission, goals, and 
objectives, the basis of meaningful measures (Poister 2003, p. 58).  
While the starting point for an effective strategy is the organizational mission, and 
desired outcomes are the destination, planning and implementation is the journey and 
perhaps offers the greatest prospect for improvement. The general concern with desired 
outputs and outcomes may have caused management to be overlooked as a measurement 
consideration in this survey. However, no one would argue management is a major 
influence on the effectiveness of any program and should be examined beyond a 
summative assessment. John Bryson recommends achieving success by monitoring 
“instrumental subordinate outcomes” along the way to the desired end of “achievement of 
organizational goals and heightened stakeholder satisfaction” (Bryson, 2004, p. 239). It 
may be extremely important to measure how management applies accepted and 
innovative leadership principles.  
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This survey confirms numerous opportunities exist to improve aviation security 
and suggests beginning in four areas. Systematic audits, including training security 
practitioners in the theory behind different types of assessments, should continue to be 
used, increased, and improved. Breech reporting statistics should include comparative 
performance data in addition to accounts of activities. Electronic information sharing 
should be expanded to facilitate benchmarking technology and individual roles, 
innovation, and linking measurements to goals and objectives. Management should be 
evaluated at all levels, including factoring in individual experience and employee 
development programs. As criminals and terrorists constantly modify their strategy and 
tactics, aviation security must continuously measure performance at all levels to keep at 
least one step ahead.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Peter Drucker once said, “no institution can possibly survive if it needs geniuses 
or supermen to manage it. It must be organized in such a way as to be able to get along 
under a leadership composed of average human beings” (Smith, 2004). This thesis 
concludes that an opportunity does exist to improve commercial airport security by 
testing innovative management and measuring the results. As the responsible regulatory 
agency, TSA should guide and oversee an industry-wide effort to advance this change, 
which means developing standards for adequate management performance, 
communicating those measures effectively, allowing innovation, monitoring results, and 
adjusting security standards as needed. 
This thesis identifies public administration and performance measurement 
principles with the potential to increase effectiveness and efficiency of airport security 
programs. The primary research question included two parts, “To what extent is 
commercial airport security currently measured and how could it be measured?” The 
secondary research questions, primarily addressed by the literature review, concerned the 
applicability of public administration and fire prevention practices to airport security.  
Within the limitations outlined in the previous chapter, the Delphi survey 
indicated airport security is currently measured somewhat crudely. While better metrics 
would undoubtedly improve public aviation security, implementing the correct 
performance measures would present numerous challenges. This research identified 
several management principles that could help meet those challenges: linking 
organizational mission and goals to performance measures, decentralized participatory 
management, strategic cost-benefit analysis and budgeting, customer service focus, and 
anticipatory business continuity planning. While these management concepts are not 
traditionally employed in the public sector, leading administrators are currently utilizing 
many. Implementing some form of these management principles could help solve many 
of the recently reported shortcomings in airport security.  
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Numerous studies cited in the literature describe how various security programs 
mandated after 9/11 are hampered by a deficiency of specific objectives, goals, and 
accepted standards. In Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, John 
M. Bryson explains how many public organizations fail to accomplish their mission due 
to a lack of understanding precisely what they are “formally mandated to do.” Aviation 
security providers could benefit from following his four steps to “Clarifying 
Organizational Mandates and Mission,”: 1) listing formal and informal mandates, 2) 
reviewing the list to determine what is required, forbidden, and allowed, 3) ensuring the 
organization is aware of these at all times, and 4) frequently evaluating the mandates for 
needed revisions (Bryson, 2004).  
As informal mandates often come from unidentified stakeholders, aviation 
security providers should also analyze who their key stakeholders are, each one’s 
particular performance criteria, and how well security is meeting those criteria. Once 
accomplished, these stakeholders should be encouraged to collaborate in creating detailed 
goals, objectives, and metrics to determine how well these objectives are being achieved. 
Without this necessary forethought, the organization can easily adopt broad generic 
security mission and objectives that result in less than full commitment of front line staff 
and management to their individual responsibilities.  
The problem of squandering resources is compounded by the public sector’s 
tendency to enforce rules and line item budgets rigidly. These stringent policies were 
originally designed to restrain the power of corrupt politicians and inept bureaucrats. 
Today, however, they tend to prohibit timely adaptation to changing conditions and risks. 
Furthermore, following rules and staying within budget can be used as a justification for 
poor decisions, which impedes accountability and conceals incompetence.  
In contrast, mission driven organizations facilitate personal responsibility by 
liberating individuals to increase effectiveness and efficiency through crafting innovative 
solutions (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). In the related public safety fields of fire protection 
standards and building codes, the current trend is to augment prescriptive codes with 
performance codes, which allows compliance with safety objectives to be demonstrated 
and encourages engineers, architects, and developers to pioneer new designs and 
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materials, often cutting costs (Wood, 2000). Nevertheless, original designs do require 
more expertise, time, and effort to validate because each application is generally unique. 
Depending on the cost analysis, TSA should pilot the “performance standard” concept in 
security programs at several pilot airports.  
As mission statements are the litmus test tying decisions and actions to values, 
prior to loosening aviation security standards, each program’s mission and objectives 
must be clearly defined. To quote the Dalai Lama XIV, “Know the rules well, so you can 
break them effectively” (Good Reads, 2013). Moreover, to increase employee 
comprehension and retention, these guidelines should be short and easily memorized; 
some authorities recommend the mission statement should be no more than eight words. 
An additional benefit is that, when employees understand and retain objectives well, 
productivity and morale are significantly increased. A positive synergy occurs when team 
members fully grasp outcome expectations and understand how their individual efforts 
coordinate to benefit institutional effectiveness (Maxwell 2003). The workforce needs to 
buy in to the organization’s purpose and objectives to adjust to ongoing change in airport 
security effectively. 
This buy-in is more easily achieved through participatory management. When 
employees are included in the goal and objective development collaboration, they are 
invested in the outcome (Drucker, 2008). Representatives from the various levels within 
the security provider organization, as well as members of customer and vender groups 
affected by the quality of security, should be recruited to create a formal declaration of 
purpose and related performance standards. Since the staff members executing 
competency-based policy and programs are in a good position to know what does and 
does not work, they may also be the best people to help design objective performance 
measurement tools. The diverse group should not be turned loose to freelance; but should 
be held accountable with formal direction, based on stakeholder expectations. For 
instance, guidelines should require objectives be SMART: specific, measurable, 
ambitious, realistic, and time bound (Poister, 2003). Furthermore, a good beginning 
might be to consider the security objectives listed by the Transportation Research Board,  
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of the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Their guidelines for 
transportation security list “deter, detect, deny, and mitigate” as primary objectives 
(Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2006).  
In the fire service, these objectives are referred to as prevent, detect, evacuate, and 
extinguish. For decades, fire safety data has illustrated the effectiveness of a preemptive 
strategy. If one primary goal of terrorists is to create disruption, chaos, and fear, a good 
deterrence is the minimization of the resulting consequences of terrorism. Continuity of 
operation plans are designed to ensure an organization can continue to provide services to 
its customers as seamlessly as possible, in spite of a crisis; in other words, “minimize the 
consequences of a crisis.” Security providers should pre-establish lines of succession, 
alternate sites for specific activities, redundant equipment, and “work around” 
capabilities as basic elements of a business continuity plan. The existence of these 
components, or better yet, a Business Continuity Management Certification by the 
Disaster Recovery Institute (Edwards & Goodrich, 2013), should be monitored by TSA 
as another quality performance measure of security. 
In the private sector, the primary performance indicator is generally considered 
the profit margin. In the public sector, since profit is rarely a factor, cost-benefit analysis, 
or quantifying the expense and risk associated with a specific policy or program, is the 
most closely related measure. In 2009, the Government Accountably Office noted that 
TSA needed to improve cost-benefit analysis (GAO, 2009) . 
The first aviation security financial cost analysis was completed in 1977, when 
William Landes calculated between 1973 and 1976 that the United States spent $63 
million per year enhancing anti-hijacking security, which equates to $238 billion in 2012 
dollars, or $34 million per deterred hijacking. The only other cost related research found 
was when Dr. Qianmei Feng compared the cost effectiveness of two baggage-screening 
methods 30 years later. She concluded that the increased reliability of using two systems 
simultaneously more than offset the additional cost. Nevertheless, both these studies were 
completed within academia, which possibly indicates that while cost benefit analysis 
should absolutely be an airport security consideration, it may be prudent to partner with 
research universities for the actual assessments.  
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Management theory also stresses the importance of listening to and servicing 
customers. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in Reinventing Government (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992), and Theodore H. Poister in Measuring Performance in Public and 
Nonprofit Organizations (Poister, 2003) recommend allowing operations level staff direct 
access to customers’ feedback. Since perception often determines security effectiveness 
(Schneier, 2003), customer service surveys can provide relative performance measures, 
as well as valuable comparative data to improve security. Today, many retailers provide 
incentives to customers willing to complete short online surveys about specific 
interactions. Participation rewards customers with a ticket in a gift card raffle in exchange 
for answering relatively short and simple questions online. These survey instruments are 
easy and inexpensive to facilitate, due to the prevalence of smart phones, tablets, and 
wireless Internet service. The retail members of the stakeholder alliance could provide 
online coupons to entice passengers to take the surveys while waiting for their plane. 
Passengers, however, are not the only group served by aviation security providers. 
Depending on their level and responsibilities, individuals in the security organization 
could answer to TSA, airport management, multiple airlines, passengers, or freight 
consignors. John M. Bryson suggests labeling key stakeholders as customers to create 
employee accountability and emphasize service quality (Bryson, 2004) to entail 
developing different survey tools for each specific group of stakeholders and customers. 
Prior to implementation, the cost, time, and effort required for the data collection and 
analysis should be documented and justified. Once employed, the process should be 
periodically reviewed, appraised, and refined as necessary.  
In his 2013 annual letter, Bill Gates argued that without accurate measurements, 
the industrial revolution could never have occurred. He points out how picking the right 
measures, establishing clear and concrete goals, and learning from success is absolutely 
critical (Gates, 2013). It is imperative that airport administrators recognize how reliable, 
timely information is necessary to solve today’s interconnected and multifaceted airport 
security problems. If all stakeholders are afforded an opportunity to contribute from their 
perspective, develop systems to fit their circumstances, and relevant data is analyzed 
efficiently with a focus on proactive planning, practical solutions can emerge.  
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APPENDIX. 
A. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND ONE  
1.1.  “What criteria do you currently use to judge the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Airport security policies and programs?”  
A.  Number of passengers waiting 10 minutes or less to be screened. 
(Checkpoint throughput) 
B.  TSA Violation History, Security Breaches (At Screening, 
Passenger Exit Point, and Perimeter), Benchmarking against other 
airports, and Outside Assessments and Audits. 
C.  I use the International Civil Aviation Organization Security Audit 
program, along with a security vulnerability assessment model 
constructed through personal experience and a variety of 
vulnerability assessment tools. It also depends on what we’re 
evaluating. GA airports are evaluated differently than commercial 
service airports. 
D.  I use a proprietary checklist that examines in detail all aspects of 
airport/airline/general aviation/support services/cargo operations. 
Depending upon the size of the operation, going through the 
checklist, identifying shortfalls, and making recommendations will 
take anywhere from two days to two weeks. 
E.  Unfortunately, all too often there has not been an accurate measure 
of how effective airport security is other than the statement that 
“there have not been any events or incidents.” In the past, the 
effectiveness has been measured by the number of weapons 
confiscated at the checkpoint, inspection results, ID compliance, 
regulatory compliance and the like. None truly represent an 
effective measure, did we get lucky and nothing happened, or were 
we tougher than the others and they decided to go somewhere else. 
The same comparison can be made in measuring illegal 
immigration and the efforts that have been put into stopping that 
problem. Are we catching more people, are they finding an 
alternative method of entry that we cannot measure, or have the 
numbers of people crossing the border decreased as a result of our 
efforts. It’s impossible to accurately measure a hidden activity. 
F.  The criterion is to achieve regulatory compliance with least 
amount of resources expended. 
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G.  Our Airport tracks the following types of information: audits, 
inspections, access control violations, security incidents. We use 
this information to 1) focus security audits and inspections on 
problem areas, 2) plan for capital funding projects to improve 
security systems (CCTV, video analysis, etc.). 
H.  Criteria used to judge the efficiency and effectiveness of Airport 
security policies and programs: Have the appropriate authorities 
reviewed and approved the specific implementation of the security 
policies and programs? Have the policies and procedures been 
reviewed at least annually to ensure they address new requirements 
and remain relevant? Have exercises been conducted, where 
appropriate, to ensure procedures are effective? (Such as for: 
natural disaster alternative procedures or for mass casualty 
responses.) Have other airport’s security programs been reviewed 
to reveal alternative, perhaps better, ways of security policy and 
program adherence? Have breaches to security policy and 
programs been analyzed to assure appropriate procedures are being 
followed and in response, have policies and programs been 
adjusted to optimize the system? Have the security policies and 
programs been tested to ensure they are effective such as: 
Introduce contraband into the screening process to ensure it is 
detected  
I. Number and Type of incidents and requests for service dispatched, 
Response times to incidents, Incident assessment time (time to 
determine if a threat exists after arrival), Number of unauthorized 
person, or authorized persons without proper credentials, detected 
within the secure area, Detection rate during daily tests of 
perimeter/secure area infiltration tests, Cost per boarded passenger 
to operate security programs (excluding TSA screening), Number 
of violent and non-violent crimes reported monthly using FBI 
UCR data, Number of employees and contractors screened and 
badged monthly 
Time to complete screening and badge new employees or 
contractors, Operational cost impact of security program on 
terminal tenants and airport contractors, Aircraft delayed due to 
security events, Have someone walk around a secure area without 
a badge to test if someone challenges the person. 
J.  Lack of reported security violations and breaches. Security 
assessments and covert challenge operations. Spot audits on 
employee knowledge of security requirements and programs. Lack 
of regulatory deficiencies discovered by TSA . 
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1.2. “Which of these do you consider most useful and why?” 
A.  Checkpoint throughput - this gives an accurate example of 
customer service. 
B.  Breaches. They are a “real world” review of the effectiveness to 
detect, resolve, and recover from a known threat. After-Action 
Reports serve as the looking glass into procedures and policies so 
we can determine what works, fails, or needs improvement. They 
are the most effective means but the least efficient. 
C.  If I had to give an answer, the ICAO Security Audit would likely 
be the best. 
D.  Obviously, the portions of the checklist where shortfalls offer the 
most likely avenues of approach to commit acts of illegal 
interference are the most important. But one has to balance that 
against the known or suspected capabilities of the adversary, and 
the tactics most likely to be used by them. As an example, if the 
adversary is known to be likely to favor armed attack against 
groups of people (i.e., the Lod, Vienna, and Rome attacks of the 
‘80s), we would pay particular attention to security measures that 
would prevent such attacks, while not ignoring others. 
E.  I don’t believe that there is an accurate measure that can be 
uniformly applied to measure airport security other than regulatory 
compliance inspections. Regulations are established and if 
uniformly enforced and measured, would establish a base-line 
measurement of an airport’s level of security.  
F.  Regulatory compliance reduces financial risk in the form of fines 
and having resources in reserve allows the organization to react 
when specific and credible threats are identified. 
G.  Tracking of security violations and incidents reflects areas of 
weakness....for instance a particular airline / tenant may have 
reoccurring type of violations indicating a lack of training. 
H.  The most useful criteria to judge the efficiency and effectiveness of 
Airport security policies and programs is to actually test the system 
to ensure it responds in the appropriate way. 
I.  1. Number and Type of incidents and requests for service 
dispatched: Provides key data for assessing the types of staff 
needed, where policy compliance or physical arrangements are 
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generating events or reducing events, helps target use of cameras 
or other solutions to improve response and reduce cost to serve. 
Frequently identifies areas where security is diverting resources to 
support other functions, increasing cost to serve and displacing 
staff from optimal response positions.  
2. Incident Response and assessment times: While a reactive 
measure, this provides insight into staffing (number and location), 
video assessment tools, prioritization of events, ability to assess 
and mitigate or escalate. Response is the final line of defense and 
the one that usually makes the six o’clock news. Given the spread 
out nature of staff and the need to make quick decisions about 
departures, a quick assessment to call for support or suspend 
operations is key to keeping minor incidents from undermining 
support for the security program, while ensuring that people are 
kept safe.  
3. Detection rates on infiltration tests: Checks policy and training 
effectiveness, electronic systems effectiveness, roving patrol and 
tenant awareness, determines areas where improved measures are 
required (soft spots).  
4. Cost per boarded passenger & operational cost to tenants, 
because this is a basic measure of efficiency, against the business 
reality of airlines, air cargo and other airport tenants. Cost per 
passenger when adjusted for regional variance makes for easy 
comparisons with other airports, which airlines and others seek to 
justify costs. Operational costs to tenants and contractors is 
everything from badging and security training to afterhours access 
delays and is cited as a factor by many contractors and tenants in 
their costs of doing business at the airport. 
J.  Security assessments and covert challenge operations – Many 
facilities and industries have robust and comprehensive security 
programs, however, the information contained within them is not 
regularly disseminated to the line personnel. By conducting the 
assessments and covert operations, it brings this information to the 
line personnel and ensures that they are receiving the necessary 
updates. 
1.3.  “What metrics pertaining to security policy or procedures would you 
like to see employed? Why?” 
A.  Passengers waiting 5 minutes or less to be screened. This would 
speak to the uniqueness of our airport. 
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B.  A catalog and record of all attempts to circumvent security 
procedures and controls. Access directly to TSA’s incident reports 
that would also allow for data mining and review of events. It 
would allow the individual airports to spot trends by type, location, 
or airport size.  
C.  Metric’s for these programs is difficult. Metrics for performance of 
personnel and equipment is fairly easy, but the challenge is if those 
performance expectations are placed into an airport or aircraft 
security program. That makes them binding by regulation, and 
many operators are hesitant to put performance benchmarks that 
are not regulatory and that they may not be able to maintain for a 
myriad of justifiable reasons (budget cuts, lack of promised federal 
funding, changes in regulatory requirements resulting in operators 
spending money on systems, methods and procedures that are no 
longer required, or are required but in a different capacity). 
I think for each of those areas where metrics can be developed, 
they should be. However, there should be flexibility in the system 
so that operators can take initiatives without worrying about being 
penalized by the TSA. 
D.  I’m a little leery of metrics. Too often the ones I’ve seen depend 
heavily on numeric scores and this tends to breed a sense of 
complacency if your score is high. Weighting of various elements 
of the metrics is always a problem. For instance, do you give more 
weight (and a lower score) to an airport who has problems 
maintaining proper perimeter security at points some distance from 
the terminal, vice not maintaining proper standoff distance for 
parked cars in the terminal area? Metrics do not and cannot replace 
the eye of an analyst who not only knows security, but knows the 
capabilities of any potential adversary, and looks at the system 
with a view toward what he/she would do to breach the system.  
E.  A realistic application of threat based risk analysis would be 
helpful when governments establish security policies and 
regulations. All too often preventing the doomsday scenario is used 
as the base-line justification and does not provide a fair 
comparison. 
F.  TSA should employ threat assessment and risk analysis for at least 
4 categories of airport. Currently, there are two categories of 




make a distinction between BWI and Lincoln, Nebraska in terms 
of the security risk facing the security managers at those two 
airports. 
G.  Since there is no national standard, it may be useful for airports (by 
category type) to compare metric results w/ other airports and to be 
able to benchmark solutions. For example, TSA sponsors multiple 
pilot programs to test for new applications of technology to 
improve aviation security. Unfortunately, this information is 
considered SSI and is not shared from one airport to another. 
H.  The metrics I would like to see employed are related to the 
empirical testing of the policy or program. Knowing if the system 
of people and/or equipment can actually detect anomalies enables 
decision makers to concentrate effort and resources on those areas 
that have been identified as needing improvement. Each policy and 
program would have its own set of tests to determine if they are 
efficient and effective. 
I.  I would like to see the incident reporting and service request data 
more standardized and centrally reported across categories of 
airports (similar to FBI Uniform Crime Reporting) it would be 
easier to develop best practices and solutions across a range of 
facilities. Today the role of airport security programs, beyond the 
TSA mandates, varies greatly by airport even within a category 
and thus comparisons are difficult. Short of an arrest or 
investigation by TSA, routine activities that might indicate 
“probing” across multiple airports would likely not be correlated 
today unless it was conducted against the screening area, a shared 
incident reporting infrastructure would make such patterns easier 
to detect. 
J.  1.  Law Enforcement, security and other public safety presence 
within the Airport environment including the # of personnel and 
how they are deployed; training; and knowledge of security 
systems, measures and procedures in place. Why? Deterrence 
should be the #1 goal of aviation security. Several terrorist 
incidents have been foiled strictly by police presence in the target 
location (The Torrance JIS Terrorism Case is an example.) In 
addition, if the officer is not aware of the requirement, he/she can 
not fulfill it. 
2.  Use of technology-based security systems such as hand-
held security devices that can read IDs, integrated access control 
and robust camera systems, central security and public safety 
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response command centers, etc. Why? This allows public safety 
and security personnel to monitor security systems in “real time” 
so that immediate action can be taken. It also reduces human error. 
3.  Public and employee security awareness programs. Why? 
Security and law enforcement personnel are a minute part of 
aviation security in an airport environment. Employees as well as 
the public user of our airports must support our security efforts. 
100,000 pairs of eyes are far greater than the few that are regularly 
assigned to aviation security efforts. By having a public awareness 
program, it also instills confidence in our employees and traveling 
public. 
4.  Technology based aviation law enforcement and security 
training systems. Why? One of the biggest complaints in an 
aviation environment is the fact that training is not on-going. An 
employee receives their initial airport training and then is generally 
not subjected to any future formal training. A major concern is the 
time it takes for employees to go to a central location for this 
training. By adding electronic kiosks that are accessed via the 
employees ID and Pin #, the training can be done at any time day 
or night and the information will be captured for documentation 
purposes. 
5.  Audits. Why? If you do not measure the effectiveness of a 
program, system, measure or procedure, then you cannot actually 
tell whether it is working or not and/or what improvements and/or 
efficiencies can be implemented.  
B. DELPHI SURVEY ROUND TWO 
2.1.  According to the first round, there is an apparent desire and 
willingness to share security performance data. Do you believe a 
secure web based, professional network, dedicated to airport security 
information sharing, would be feasible and worth the effort? Why?  
A. Yes. This type of network will allow us to quickly “connect the 
dots.” When we determine our threat levels and countermeasures, 
we have to assess significant bombings, thwarted or discovered 
plots, special events that are occurring or significant dates. Once 
that is done we combine this information with current events and 
we can then see any patterns that are developing as well as devise 
and implement countermeasures. A secure information network 
will allow those individuals that develop these countermeasures to 
have real-time information that is occurring in like disciplines as 
well as any countermeasures that have been developed that would 
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be appropriate in a variety of venues. Without this pertinent and 
time relevant information, the development of countermeasures 
and security protocols is rendered virtually useless.  
B.  I do think a website would be a benefit, but if the information 
contained is voluntary, it would provide only a spotty indication of 
how airports are doing or how my airport stands in relation to 
others. To assure evenhandedness and comprehensiveness, I would 
recommend that the website be hosted by TSA and among other 
things like a security library and chat rooms on specific subjects, 
they should publish metrics -- which would need to be established 
in conjunction with the stakeholders.  
C.  Yes. It would be a very valuable tool for the sharing of information 
and experiences from many different areas, regions, perspectives, 
and agencies. I believe it is now more feasible than in the past, 
especially with the advent of so many on-line forums that exist 
today. 
D.  Shared TSA reports of incidents do help with data-mining. It 
allows the individual airports to see common events and determine 
how well they, themselves, are guarded from a similar incident. 
TSA does have a website for information, though I do not know 
how much I can discuss since it protected by “SSI.” 
E.  Yes, I absolutely believe we need this. There is a tremendous lack 
of information sharing in the aviation security industry. There 
seems to be a lack of trust on the part of the federal government to 
allow private security practitioners and even local governments 
like airport operators. When aviation safety became an issue, 
NASA started the Aviation Safety Reporting System - this allowed 
the sharing of safety information to go on in a anonymous, non-
punitive environment. We need to do the same with aviation 
security. A good background check will solve most of the security 
problems and I think most people in the industry would go along 
with that.  
F.  Yes, I believe that sharing of security performance data and 
metrics would be beneficial to all involved. There are a number of 
different platforms that can be used for this information, although I 
would suggest that the initiative be undertaken by representative 
Airport Associations. Wiki’s, information sharing platforms such 
as HSIN could be utilized and existing databases and statistical 
reporting developed by DOT should be explored as well.  
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G.  The TSA already has a website that ASC’s can access but it is 
under-utilized. The TSA posts incident reports but many that I 
know do not have time to go through those reports and they’re not 
all that useful. Also, owing to the sensitive nature of some of these 
issues, I have found that a telephone conversation with a trusted 
colleague is invaluable.  
2.2.  Is the International Civil Aviation Organization Security Audit 
Program a valuable tool? I am not familiar with this program. Why?  
A.  To my knowledge, it is not readily used in the American aviation 
environment.  
B. I have not worked with the ICAO Security Audit Program.  
C.  Yes. There is always a need for rules, standards and audits. 
D.  Not on the individual airport, basis. ICAO’s focus is too broad and 
directed to TSA policy and procedures  
E.  Yes it is. It’s the baseline security elements. Airport and airline 
operators should however make sure they do other types of audits 
to cover any gaps in the ICAO program. 
F.  I cannot comment on the ICAO Security Audit Program since I 
have not been exposed to it. I have researched it on the web and 
think that it would form a good starting point for any country 
specific audit program. 
G.  I am unfamiliar with the ICAO Security Audit Program but in my 
work, we used an audit program that was developed locally.  
2.3.  Considering the concerns and ideas expressed in the survey’s first 
round, what methods would best help determine how to allocate 
security resources?  
A.  I believe the best methods to best held determine how to allocate 
security resources are 1) Analysis of operational losses due to 
security events; 2) Covert testing and auditing; and 3) Employee 
awareness of security requirements. Why? With today’s economic 
client, dollars and cents are major concerns of any airport’s 
administration; cost/benefit analysis must accompany every 
proposal for airport security enhancements. If you can prove that 
enhanced airport security protocols will cost less that operational 
losses due to security events, proposals to enhance security will 
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become more of a business necessity than an aviation security 
concern. Covert testing allows you to pinpoint areas that require 
security improvements and provides the necessary data to support 
your position. And lastly, employee security awareness programs 
allow you to enlist hundreds, if not thousands in many cases, of 
additional eyes and ears to assist your security personnel for a 
minimum amount of funds expended.  
B.  The best way to allocate security resources is to conduct a risk 
analysis that would include a vulnerability assessment and a gap 
analysis to see where resources would be most effectively utilized 
to increase the level of security. 
C.  That is a difficult question to answer. It would different things for 
different areas of the country. It is my opinion that security is a 
fluid thing, a moving target if you will. While there must be rules 
and standards, you must also be able to react to an every changing 
threat. Please note that react may indicate being too late to prevent, 
but there is only so much anticipation that can be done. 
D.  An intelligence network that not only relies on airport and aircraft 
incidents, but relates other events (cyber-attacks, techniques, 
attempts, etc.) as incidents to be guarded against. 
E.  This is a big question. I think first there needs to be standard risk 
assessments - not what “could” occur, but given the circumstances 
and the threats and threat profiles, there needs to be a national 
assessment and local assessments. The national assessment should 
drive a national policy. Local assessments should drive federal 
funding to allocate the needed resources. 
F.  I feel that risk based vulnerability assessments are the best method 
of allocating security resources on a macro level. 
G. The TSA is working on a new program to produce a “playbook” 
where a menu of security measures are outlined and airport 
operators and FSD’s can pick from this menu measures that are 
tailored to individual airports based on threat assessment. Airports 
will necessarily employ varying levels of complexity and 
sophistication based on a threat assessment with local emphasis. I 
think that’s appropriate and I am supportive of this effort.  
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